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Abstract 
When investigating the role of regulatory capital in bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) we 
finds that i.e. US targets are better capitalized than their acquirers and non-acquired peers and 
that US banks maintain higher capital than European banks. Thus, US banks strategically raise 
their capital levels to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Furthermore, more value is created for targets 
with higher excess capital and in M&As involving targets with considerably higher excess capital 
ratios than their acquirers. Thus, the excess regulatory capital hypothesis is supported. The 
market prices the influence that capital has on the probability of the merger’s regulatory approval. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The financial services industry around the globe is consolidating. Starting in the United 
States (US) in the 1980s, a wave of bank merger reached Europe in the 1990s. From 1997 to 
1999 merger activity in the financial sector reached unprecedented heights with approximately 
900 transactions per year in total worth 1.2 trillion US dollar ($) in the Group of Ten countries 
alone.1 This represents a threefold increase in the number and a tenfold increase in the value of 
deals compared to 1990. In the US, the number of commercial banks has consequently fallen 
from more than 15000 banks in 1984 to just around 8500 in 1999. Although some banks failed 
and some new banks were formed during this period, bank M&As accounted for the elimination 
of around 7000 banks. Similarly, around 2500 M&As involving credit institutions took place in 
the European Union only in the period from 1995 to the first half of 2000.2 Since 2000 there is 
no indication that the merger wave is slowing down.  
A few regulatory developments have largely facilitated this process. In the United States, 
restrictions on banks’ ability to expand geographically were relaxed in the 1980s and 1990s and 
ultimately removed in 1994 with the passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and 
Branching Efficiency Act.3 The act overturned the McFadden Act of 1927, which had prohibited 
banks from branching across states, and, in practice, established the basis for a true nationwide 
banking system. More recently, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Financial Services Modernization Act 
of 1999 overturned the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, which had separated commercial from 
investment banking activities. This paved the way for the creation of a universal banking system, 
with commercial banks providing a full range of banking, securities, and insurance services, all 
                                                          
1 See Group of Ten (2001). 
2 See Wheelock and Wilson (2004) and European Central Bank (2000) for US and European data, respectively. 
3 Berger, Kashyap and Scalise (1995) provide a comprehensive (year-by-year) account of the changes in US laws. 
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within the authority of a single legal entity, and stimulated consolidation across financial service 
activities. In the European Union (EU), the ongoing integration of national economies has had a 
similar effect on the banking industry. More specifically, the Second Banking Directive of 1989 
introduced the idea of a single banking license valid throughout the EU and established the 
universal banking structure for all member states. The creation of the European Monetary Union 
has put all banks under the supervision of the European Central Bank. More recently, the 
introduction of the single currency has targeted financial and banking market integration. Banks 
have responded by seeking to consolidate their positions via M&As to achieve competitive 
viability in the single European market.  
The effects of consolidation on banks and the banking market as a whole have been 
extensively researched. It is generally accepted that mergers can result in overall benefits due to 
increased efficiency from economies of scale and scope, cost reductions through elimination of 
redundancies, reduced earnings volatility through diversification, and revenue enhancement 
through increased market power. In this paper we propose and investigate another possible factor 
that could play a role in the consolidation of the banking industry: Regulatory bank capital. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the role of capital in bank M&As seems to have been neglected by 
researchers. Only a few studies touch on the issue, and only one of them does so with regulatory 
capital in mind. This lack of research may well reflect a belief among practitioners and 
academics that bank capital is not a major consideration in the decision to merge. However, a 
self-contained investigation of the role of regulatory capital in bank M&As is warranted for at 
least two reasons. First, whatever the results of such a study, it will contribute to a fuller picture 
and a better understanding of the causes and consequences of bank consolidation. Second, and 
more importantly, there seems to be a valid reason why capital should play a role in bank 
consolidation: Under the current Basle I Accord capital adequacy standards, a bank is required to 
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maintain 4% of Tier 1 capital and 8% of Total capital relative to its risk-weighted assets. 
However, many banks maintain capital levels in excess of these regulatory minima. There could 
be a number of reasons for that, the most important of which being risk-averse managers, who 
want to maintain a cushion for protection against poor performance or unexpected losses. 
However, low-capital banks have a higher equity multiplier than their high-capital counterparts 
and are, therefore, able to provide higher returns on equity (ROE). Consequently, the former 
have a competitive advantage over the latter, because they can reduce return on assets (ROA) by 
cutting prices or expanding their asset base, while still providing competitive returns to 
shareholders. However, if relatively high-capital banks provide lower returns to shareholders and 
are less competitive, they may be especially attractive as merger or acquisition targets because of 
the post-acquisition possibility for the acquiring bank to reduce the capital holdings of the 
acquired institution and increase returns to shareholders. Therefore, the question of whether 
banks with high levels of regulatory capital are more attractive as targets is of particular 
interest. 
Based on a sample of 105 US and European bank mergers from 1997 to 2003 our 
analysis and results can be summarized as follows: Mean difference tests reveal that i.e. US 
target banks are better capitalized than their acquirers and non-acquired peers. Event study 
analysis show that in US M&As value is created for target banks’ shareholders but destroyed for 
acquiring banks’ shareholders. In contrast, European M&As create shareholder wealth for both 
groups. Here targets and – at least in the short-run – acquirers display positive abnormal returns. 
Bank capital levels play a double role as is revealed by quartile comparisons and regression 
analysis: First, high-capital targets compared to low-capital targets create more value. Second, 
mergers involving target banks with considerably higher capital ratios than their acquirers create 
more value than mergers where the target has the same or lower capital ratios than the acquirer.  
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We thus conclude that an acquisition premium exists for the target bank and the market prices 
the positive influence that regulatory capital has on the probability of the merger being approved 
by regulators. Finally there is also some marginal evidence that the potential of the acquiring 
bank to reduce the excess capital holdings of the target institution is valued by the market and 
this upside potential accrues to the acquiring banks’ shareholders. 
 
THE BASLE ACCORD RISK-BASED CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS4
The 1988 Basle Accord is a landmark regulatory agreement as for the first time laws and 
regulations affecting banks in many different countries were jointly established. By setting 
uniform capital requirements, the Basle Accord aimed at reducing the risk of the international 
banking system and at reducing the competitive inequality that arose from differences among 
national bank-capital regulations.5 Before the Accord, cross-country comparisons of the capital 
levels of international banks were difficult since national definitions of bank capital differed 
substantially. Thus, before establishing international regulatory standards for capital adequacy, a 
common definition of capital was needed. The Accord provides such a common international 
definition of bank capital that divides capital into two tiers as shown in Table 1. Tier 1 capital is 
common to all of the member countries, thus making it useful for cross-country comparisons. It 
                                                          
4 Most information in this chapter is based on Bank for International Settlements (1989). 
5 Regulators and bankers argued that different capital rules gave banks with low capital requirements an advantage 
over banks subject to higher capital requirements. By increasing their asset base or reducing prices, low-capital 
banks could accept lower returns on assets to achieve a given return on equity and thereby increase their market 
share. This had allowed Japanese banks to capture more than one-third of international lending during the 1980s. 
Thus, the ultimate goal of the Accord was to eliminate the pricing advantage of Japanese banks and create a more 
level playing field across countries.   
 4
consists of the most permanent forms of capital, such as ordinary shares or common stock 
(including retained earnings) and disclosed reserves, less goodwill. Some forms of preferred 
stock (non-cumulative perpetual preferred stock) are also considered part of Tier 1 capital by US 
bank holding companies. The second type of capital, Tier 2 capital consists of elements that at 
least one member country considers bank capital. Thus, it can include any combination of the 
eligible capital elements permitted by the national regulator. Generally, Tier 2 capital represents 
less permanent forms of capital, or capital that carries a fixed or cumulative cost, such as general 
provisions, redeemable preference shares, cumulative preferred stock, hybrid instruments or 
subordinated debt.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
 In addition to providing a common definition of bank capital, the Accord requires 
international banks to hold Total capital (Tier 1 plus Tier 2 capital) equal to at least 8 % of a 
basket of assets measured in different ways according to their riskiness. The Accord assigns 
various weights to broad categories of credit risk in a bank’s asset portfolio (0, 10, 20, 50, and 
100%). Low credit risk assets, such as cash or Treasury securities issued by an OECD country, 
have a 0% risk-based capital requirement. In contrast, claims on commercial companies and real 
estate investments have a 100% risk weight. Off-balance sheet exposures (bank guarantees, 
letters of credit, etc.) are included with their appropriate conversion factors. The sum of weighted 
assets constitutes adjusted total assets (or risk-weighted assets) of which 8 % (4% in Tier 1 
elements and 4% in Tier 2 elements) is the minimum capital base. Tier 2 capital is only eligible 
up to 100 % of Tier 1 capital. A 1996 amendment to the 1988 Accord requires commercial banks 
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that engage in significant trading activity (10% of total assets on a world-wide consolidated basis 
or $1 billion or more) to set aside additional capital to cover the market risks inherent in their 
trading accounts.6 The amendment allows sophisticated banks to use their own internally 
developed value-at-risk models to determine adequate capital requirements. Banks can meet this 
new capital requirement with standard forms of capital (Tier 1 or Tier 2) or by issuing a new 
form of capital, called Tier 3 capital. It consists of less permanent, more fluid forms of capital 
(such as short-term subordinated debt) retained to cover losses on trading activities and other 
market-related risks. 
Since the early 1990s, the Basle Accord capital requirements have become the standard 
for regulators throughout the industrialized world. The methodology applies to all financial 
intermediaries in the EU and was implemented in the member via the Own Funds Directive 
(1989), the Solvency Ratio Directive (1989), and the Capital Adequacy Directive (1993). In the 
United States, the regulation came into force in 1992 and was extended to the insurance and 
securities industries. Today, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision claims that more than 
one hundred national regulators throughout the world have adopted its risk-based capital 
requirements.   
 Besides the Basle Accord risk-based capital requirements, US banks are subject to an 
additional domestic capital requirement. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Federal Reserve Board are jointly 
responsible for monitoring and regulating the US financial services industry. They require banks 
and other depository institutions to maintain a minimum leverage ratio of Tier 1 capital to total 
average assets. The minimum ratio depends on the institution’s rating under the regulatory 
                                                          
6 See Bank for International Settlements (1996). 
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CAMELS7 rating system. The minimum Tier 1 leverage ratio for institutions with a CAMEL 
rating of 1 is 3%. For all other institutions the ratio is 4%. Furthermore, the 1991 Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) added to the existing capital adequacy 
guidelines a uniform framework for prompt corrective regulatory action. Under this framework, 
each institution falls into one of five regulatory capital categories based primarily on the three 
capital measures: Tier 1 leverage, Total risk-based, and Tier 1 risk-based capital. The five 
categories and the minimum capital levels are presented in Table 2. 
 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
 
 The Prompt Corrective Action provisions of FDICIA require that regulatory bodies apply 
progressively more stringent restrictions on an institution’s operations as its capital category falls. 
These restrictions range from limiting or prohibiting the institution’s ability to engage in certain 
activities, such as making acquisitions, branching, or entering new lines of business 
(undercapitalized), to restricting asset growth (significantly undercapitalized), to the appointment 
of a receiver or conservator of the institution’s net assets (critically undercapitalized). Even 
institutions falling in the adequately capitalized category (the minimum regulatory requirements) 
could be subject to some discretionary restrictions by regulators.8 Thus, although not legally 
obliged, US banks have a strong incentive to maintain their capital levels in the well-capitalized 
category in order to avoid constant regulatory scrutiny and restrictions on their operations. 
                                                          
7 The CAMELS rating derives its name from the various components that are rated: capital adequacy, assets quality, 
management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to interest rates. 
8 Adequately and well-capitalised institutions could be restricted from paying dividends or management fees to 
controlling persons if this would result in undercapitalization. 
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 Over time, limitations of the 1988 Basle Accord have become apparent. First, it is argued 
that the regulatory measure of bank risk as stipulated by the risk weights can differ substantially 
from the actual risk the bank faces. Banks today derive a large portion of their income not from 
their traditional deposit-taking and lending activities but from trading activities and service fees, 
which exposes them to significant market risk. However, as currently written, the risk-based 
capital standards account primarily for credit risk.  A second criticism of the Accord has to do 
with the unchanging 8% minimum capital requirement – the so-called “rules-based” approach.9 
The argument is that risk is not constant throughout the business cycle. Thus, it may be preferable 
to require banks to keep more than the 8% minimum in the contractionary phase of the business 
cycle to guard against the more risky operating environment usually associated with an economic 
downturn. To address these limitations, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision has spent 
the past several years developing the Basle II Capital Accord.10 This new regulation is meant to 
expand the 1988 Accord in four main areas: (1) A bank’s minimum capital ratio will be 
calculated on the sum of the bank’s credit, market, and operational risks. This expanded 
definition of risk reflects the type of business in which banks now engage and the business 
environment in which banks operate. (2) Banks will be able to use their own market risk models, 
such as value-at-risk (VAR), for setting capital requirements. That is, instead of using “rules-
based” approach to determine adequate bank capital, a more flexible, “risk-focused” approach 
that relies on modern portfolio theory. (3) The internal management procedure banks use to 
decide on how much capital to hold will be subject to supervisory review, after which banks 
could be required to hold capital beyond the regulatory minimum in some circumstances. (4) 
                                                          
9 See IMF (1998). 
10 See Bank for International Settlements (2001). 
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There will be increased bank disclosure standards in terms of bank capital and risk exposure to 
strengthen the position of market participants in encouraging banks to hold more capital. The 
Basle II Capital Accord is expected to come into effect at year-end 2006 as the committee has 
been exploring a number of important issues since the draft of the new accord was released in 
January 2001. 
 
CURRENT EVIDENCE ON US AND EUROPEAN BANK M&AS 
 Research on bank M&As has been conducted following one of two distinct approaches. 
The first one uses market data and the event study methodology to evaluate the stock market 
reaction to merger announcements. As such, the studies that follow this approach address the 
critical question of whether bank M&As create shareholder wealth. The second approach uses 
accounting data to determine why banks merge and whether consolidation leads to changes in 
efficiency, costs, revenues, or profits.11   
 Regarding the first approach, most of the empirical research on abnormal returns in bank 
mergers uses US data whereas only a few studies use European data.12 Although some studies 
investigate where the value gains come from, neither of them has examined the role of regulatory 
capital in the market valuation of bank M&As. The US evidence suggests that bank M&As over 
the past 20 years have, on average, been a zero-sum exercise. Target bank shareholders earn 
significantly positive abnormal returns in the period around the merger announcement at the 
expense of acquiring bank shareholders. The overall value created is either slightly positive, but 
not statistically significant, or non-existent suggesting that, on average, there is a redistribution of 
                                                          
11 See Rhoades (1994) for an excellent discussion of the two approaches. 
12 The only study that uses both, US and non-US data to examine the wealth effects of bank mergers, is that of 
DeLong (2003a). 
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wealth. Results to this effect are consistently reported by a wide variety of studies using various 
samples, time periods, and levels of analysis.13 However, those mergers that do create value seem 
to involve efficient acquirers, high degree of geographic overlap between the merging banks, 
narrow activity focus, high potential for cost reductions, and cash or conditional-stock method of 
payment. The European evidence on abnormal returns in bank mergers is limited (Rad and Van 
Beek 1999, Cybbo-Ottone and Murgia 2000, and Beitel and Schiereck 2001). To some extent this 
scarcity of research reflects the methodological difficulties in studying the European market. For 
example, only a small minority of banks in Europe has actively traded. The general picture that 
emerges is that bank M&As result in significant value creation for target bank’s shareholders and 
no significant value destruction for acquiring bank’s shareholders. Thus, on aggregate European 
bank M&As create significant shareholder wealth. However, Beitel and Schiereck (2001) observe 
an interesting phenomenon – more recent European bank M&As announced in the period 1998 to 
2000 have, on aggregate, destroyed value. Target bank’s shareholders still earn significantly 
positive abnormal results, but acquiring bank’s shareholders experience significantly negative 
market reaction. These results were more pronounced for large acquirers and those involved in 
cross-border transactions.   These findings are somewhat more consistent with the US evidence. 
A possible explanation is that as capital markets in Europe develop and become increasingly 
important as a source of financing (which is the case in the USA), the pattern of stock market 
reaction to merger announcements is becoming more similar to the US experience. With respect 
to sources of value creation, Cybbo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) obtain similar results to those 
                                                          
13 See for example Hannan and Wolken (1989), Hawawini and Swary (1990), Cornett and Tehranian (1992), 
Houston and Ryngaert (1994), Madura and Wiant (1994), Siems (1996), Pilloff (1996), DeLong (2001), Houston, 
James and Ryngaert (2001), DeLong (2003b). Rhoades (1994) and Pilloff and Santomero (1998) review the 
extensive literature on the US experience. 
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reported for the US market. They find that domestic and focused (bank-to-bank) deals create 
more shareholder value than cross-border and diversifying transactions. From the latter group, 
only bancassuarance deals were found to create value, whereas mergers with investment banks 
were found to destroy value. 
 The second approach to studying bank mergers and acquisitions uses accounting data to 
determine what drives bank mergers and whether consolidation leads to changes in efficiency, 
costs, revenues, or profits.14 The typical methodology in most of the studies that use accounting 
data is to compare balance sheet-based indicators of performance of the merging banks (e.g., 
ROA, ROE, etc.) before and after the merger to see if there is a change in performance around the 
time of the merger activity.15 Here is appears that, on average, bank M&As do not significantly 
improve the performance of the merging entities. Alternatively, some studies use stochastic 
frontier methodologies to determine whether M&As in the banking industry improve the 
efficiency of the consolidating entities.16 Again, most of the studies report that, on average, bank 
                                                          
14 Proponents of using accounting data argue that they measure actual performance rather than market expectations 
and are, therefore, likely to be a more reliable indicator of merger-related gains. Furthermore, accounting 
performance can be directly measured and the data used are both readily available and well understood. A major 
shortcoming of this approach, however, is the fact that accounting numbers, although designed to measure actual 
performance, can be inaccurate in an economic sense. They are based on historical figures and ignore current market 
values. Furthermore, accounting measures of performance can be manipulated and are dependent on the accounting 
standards in use. Thus, using this approach to studying cross-border mergers and acquisitions should take into 
consideration any potential differences in accounting standards. 
15 See Shrinivasan (1992), Shrinivasan and Wall (1992), Linder and Crane (1993), Rhoades (1993), Spindt and 
Tarhan (1993), Vander Vennet (1996), Chamberlain (1998), Calomiris and Karceski (1998). 
16 See Berger and Humphrey (1992), DeYoung (1993), Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey (1997), DeYoung (1997), 
Berger (1998), Resti (1998), Focarelli, Panetta, & Salleo (2000). 
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mergers do not improve significantly either the cost or profit efficiency of the merging entities. 
Finally, a few studies compare the characteristics of the merging banks to those of a control 
group of non-merging banks to determine which banks are more likely to engage in merger 
activity, either as acquirers or as targets. For example, Hannan and Rhoades (1987), Moore 
(1997) and Wheelock and Wilson (2000) identify the characteristics that make individual US 
banks more likely to become takeover targets. They find that banks with low capital are relatively 
more attractive as acquisition targets. Hannan and Rhoades (1987) suggest that, other things 
equal, higher capitalized banks require a greater payment, which makes them less attractive as 
acquisition targets. However, Wheelock and Wilson (2000) propose that lower capitalized banks 
are closer to the point of becoming insolvent and are thus more likely to exit the industry by 
being acquired. Finally, O’Keefe (1996) finds that target banks’ equity capitalization rates are 
higher, on average, than those of their acquirers but significantly lower than those of their non-
acquired peers. However, the study fails to find a significant relationship between the equity 
capitalization rate of a bank and the probability of it being acquired. Furthermore, the author 
investigates the characteristics of the banks that make them more likely to acquire other banks. 
acquiring banks seemed to have lower equity capitalization rates than their targets and non-
acquiring peers, and lower capitalized banks were more likely to acquire other banks. However, 
the factors that seemed to be the most significant determinants of merger activity for both 
acquirers and targets were size, liquidity, loan concentration, and management quality. In general, 
large, efficient, and well-run banks acquired much smaller, less efficient, and poorly managed 
institutions. The only study, which examines the role of regulatory bank capital in mergers and 
acquisitions, is that of Hannan and Pilloff (2004). The authors test what they call the “excess 
regulatory capital” argument. Under this hypothesis, banks with levels of regulatory capital in 
excess of the required minimum will engage in more acquisitions as bidders than banks for which 
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the regulatory capital level is binding. The authors argue that there are at least two reasons for 
that. First, banks with no excess regulatory capital wishing to engage in a certain acquisition may 
be deterred to do so by regulators, because the merger might cause the combined entity to violate 
minimum capital adequacy standards. However, targets with levels of regulatory capital in excess 
of the required minimum are less likely to violate minimum capital standards and, thus, more 
likely to acquire other banks. Second, banks with excess regulatory capital may free some of this 
capital and boost returns to shareholders. This may, in turn, increase the valuation of the 
company, which could facilitate acquisition activity. The authors test the excess regulatory 
capital hypothesis, using panel data analysis, on a sample of 38 large bank holding companies 
that existed in the period 1998-2002. They estimate the relationship between the regulatory 
capital level of a bank and subsequent merger activity (the number of acquisitions that the bank 
holding company engages in). They fail to find a significant relationship between the two and 
thus conclude that the level of regulatory bank capital is not a significant determinant of merger 
activity. However, their study is limited in two aspects. First, there are at least two reasons that 
the results of this study are not of general relevance: First, the analysis is limited to the largest 
bank holding companies in the USA (with total assets of at least $15 billion). Second, the study 
does not address the question of whether banks that engage in merger activity either as acquirers 
or as targets are higher or lower capitalized than those that do not engage in merger activity. In 
this paper we attempt to overcome these limitations by focusing on a larger sample and by 
distinguishing acquirers and targets. Thus, based on the excess regulatory capital hypothesis we 
expect that both acquirers and targets have relatively high capital level (to increase the 
probability of regulatory approval) and that acquirers focus on targets with higher capital levels 
(as these exhibit inefficiently low ROE). 
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SAMPLE SELECTION 
The data used in this study are collected from five different sources: Zephyr, an electronic 
database of global mergers and acquisitions from 1997 to 2004 from the Thompson Financial 
Data Company; DataStream, an electronic database of company information including stock 
market quotations also from the Thompson Financial Data Company; Edgar, a web-based 
database of US listed companies’ filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC); 
Bankscope, an electronic database of bank financial statement data. This last source is 
supplemented with the authors’ own collection of annual reports of banks. 
In a first step, a preliminary list of US and European, domestic as well as cross-border 
bank M&As announced in the period 1997 to 2003 is created by searching Zephyr. In order for a 
merger to be included at least one of the parties - acquirer or target – needs to be a bank, the other 
being a financial services firm. Furthermore, only quoted companies are considered so that the 
stock market reaction to merger announcements can be analyzed. Finally, only deals resulting in 
the acquirer controlling the majority stake in the target (50% or more of the common stock 
outstanding) are considered. Note that the European sub-sample is restricted to the European 
Union plus Switzerland and Norway.17 This procedure yields 216 transactions, of which 59 are 
European and 157 are US mergers.  In a second step, we require the following data for each 
merger transaction: (1) The date of the merger announcement – available in the Zephyr database. 
(2) Stock market prices adjusted for dividends and capital changes for both acquirer and target for 
                                                          
17 The markets of Central and Eastern Europe were excluded because the banking sector and capital markets in this 
region are still underdeveloped and acquisition activity in the time period studied is to a large extent determined by 
privatisation programs. Most importantly, banks in this region are subject to domestic capital adequacy requirements 
different from those established by the Basle Accord and different for every country, which would have made 
comparisons of capital levels meaningless. 
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approximately one year prior to the merger announcement. These data are collected from 
DataStream. Mergers for which neither or just one of the parties had a stock quotation in 
DataStream or for which the data were insufficient are discarded. (3) Tier 1 and Total risk-based 
capital ratios for both acquirer and target for the year immediately prior to the merger 
announcement. For the US banks capital ratios are collected from Edgar.  For the European banks 
the annual reports are searched manually. Again, deals for which capital ratios are available for 
neither or just one of the parties are discarded. (4) Total assets of both acquirer and target for the 
year immediately preceding the one in which the merger announcement was made. These are 
collected in the same way as the previous item. These four requirements considerably reduce the 
size of the sample. Full data is available only for 105 deals - 84 US and 21 European mergers. It 
should be noted, however, that this sample size is considerably larger than that of most other 
studies on abnormal returns in bank mergers. The distribution of the mergers over time and 
countries is presented in Table 3.   
  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
  
The providers of the Zephyr database claim that it contains the complete populations of 
M&As since 1997. As such a comparison of the preliminary and the final sample can reveal 
selection biases due to our data requirements. With 100 out of 105, the majority of the 
transactions in the final sample involve partners from the same country. This was also true for the 
preliminary sample where only 7 out of the 216 mergers initially identified are cross-border 
transactions. Thus, among listed banks this seems to be a general feature of bank mergers during 
the time period rather than a sample bias. Another feature of the final sample is that not all 
European countries are equally represented. In fact, some markets are not represented at all. 
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Again, this was also the case in the preliminary sample. For example, Austria, Portugal, Finland, 
and Luxembourg do not have any bank mergers among listed partners in the time period studied 
and the Netherlands, Ireland, and Spain have just one transaction each, which are not included in 
the final sample due to lack of either stock market or capital ratios data. The most active 
European markets are those of the United Kingdom, Italy, and Germany, which is also the case in 
the final sample. Thus, despite its small size, the European sub-sample is generally representative 
of the population of European bank mergers among listed partners in the time period examined.   
The distribution over time suggests that most of the merger activity is concentrated in the 
second half of the sample period from 2000 to 2003 with only four transactions taking place from 
1997 to 1999.  This is generally consistent with the theoretical literature and empirical findings 
that merger activity tends to occur in waves.  A possible explanation for the increase in merger 
activity in the 2000 to 2003 period is the introduction of the Euro for the European market and 
the relaxation of the interstate branching and universal banking restrictions for the US market. 
One striking difference between the US and European merger sample should be mentioned at the 
outset: European acquirers and targets tend to be considerably larger than their US counterparts. 
The mean (median) size of European acquirers and targets is $ 157 bn ($ 114 bn) and $ 44 bn ($ 
2.6 bn), respectively.  In the US, mean (median) acquirer and target size amounts to only $ 22 bn 
($ 4.4 bn) and $ 4.7 bn ($ 0.5 bn), respectively. These findings are consistent with other studies 
on abnormal returns in bank mergers18 and are most likely driven by the fact that the majority of 
banks in Europe are closely held, state-owned, or co-operative societies and that only a small 
portion of very large banks have actively traded stocks.  
                                                          
18 Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) compare the average size of the banks in their sample of European mergers with 
those of selected US studies and find almost identical results. Similar findings are also reported by DeLong (2003a). 
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 In addition to the main sample of merger transactions, we collect a control sample of 
banks not engaged in any M&A activity during the sample period. For inclusion in this control 
sample a bank has to satisfy four criteria: First, the bank has to be listed. Note that this 
requirement does not affect substantially the composition of the US sub-sample as the majority of 
US banks including even relatively small institutions are listed. However, as only large European 
banks have stock market quotations this requirement results in a European sub-sample consisting 
of companies much larger, on average, than the banks in the US sub-sample. However, this 
feature of the control sample is desirable since the European banks in the core sample of mergers 
are also much larger than their US counterparts. Therefore, this requirement assures that the 
control sample is structured similarly to the core sample of deals and that the European sub-
sample of non-acquired banks is directly comparable to the sub-sample of European targets. 
Second, we require that the bank be a resident of one of the countries included in the study. 
Banks from countries not represented in my core sample, but nevertheless covered in the study, 
are included in the control sample as well. Third, we require that the bank has not been engaged 
in any M&A activity during the sample period either as acquirer or as target. To make sure this is 
the case, each bank included in the sample is checked in the Zephyr database for any acquisition 
record. Banks, which engage in mergers that are only announced but not subsequently completed, 
are not included in the sample. Finally, the bank must have at least two consecutive years of total 
assets and capital ratios available in the sample period. All dollar values of total assets are 
adjusted by the CPI to 2003 values. Similarly, the consecutive observations of Tier 1 and Total 
capital ratios were averaged to produce the mean values for the period. These control sample data 
are collected from Bankscope for the European banks and from the Edgar database for the US 
banks. Overall, for our control sample we are able to identify 195 banks of which 92 are 
European and 103 are US banks.  
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 METHODOLOGY AND RESULTS 
Difference in capital ratios 
As a first step in the analysis we perform mean-difference tests to compare the pre-merger 
regulatory capital levels of the target banks with those of their acquirers and non-acquired peers. 
If the excess regulator capital hypothesis is correct, we would expect to find: (1) If acquirers 
select their targets with the objective to benefit from the reduction in excess capital, targets 
should maintain, on average, higher pre-merger regulatory capital levels than their acquirers. (2) 
If concerns regarding regulatory intervention matter, than targets and acquirers should have, on 
average, higher pre-merger capital levels than their non-merging peers.  
First we compare the mean capital ratios and total assets in the year before the merger of 
the target banks with those of their acquirers. The capital ratios are approximately normally 
distributed as indicated by a comparison of the mean and median values. Thus, the standard t-test 
for the difference between the means of two populations is used. Total assets, however, have 
strongly skewed distributions and therefore a non-parametric z-test is more appropriate. The 
results reported in Table 4 suggest the following: First, acquiring banks are significantly larger in 
size than their targets. This is true for the total sample as well as for the US and European sub-
samples.19 This finding is consistent with the empirical and theoretical literature on mergers and 
acquisitions in general. Broadly speaking, the size of a company is an approximate indicator of 
its value, and consequently, a smaller firm is cheaper and easier to purchase. Conversely, larger 
firms generally have more funds and access to more financing options than smaller companies, 
and it is therefore easier for them to afford an acquisition. The results suggest that the banking 
                                                          
19 Paired two-sample tests show even more significant results but as paired tests can only be conducted for acquirers 
versus targets, they are not reported in the table. 
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industry is not an exception to this principle. Second, target banks have, on average, significantly 
higher regulatory capital ratios than their acquirers. This finding is robust for the total sample as 
well as for the US sub-sample but only with respect to Tier 1 capital for the European sub-
sample. These findings are again consistent with our expectations and with results reported in 
other empirical studies. Thus, for example, Hannan and Pilloff (2004) report that “banking 
organizations that were acquired by the bank holding companies in our sample tended to have 
larger capital ratios than their acquirers” (p. 25). Similarly, O’Keefe (1996) reports that the target 
banks’ equity capitalization rates in his sample are, on average, higher than those of their 
acquirers. Although the authors do not explicitly investigate the issue, Hannan and Pilloff suggest 
that this result may simply stem from the fact that larger banking organizations tend to have 
lower capital ratios. A possible reason for this could be that larger companies often have more 
diversified portfolios and, thus, they are less risky and need to hold less excess capital. As target 
banks, however, are often of smaller size than their acquirers, they may have, on average, higher 
capital ratios than their acquirers. To see if such a relationship exists we explicitly test for the 
correlation between total assets and regulatory capital ratios and find that, although negative in 
sign as suggested by Hannan and Pilloff, the correlation coefficients of -0.23 for total assets and 
Tier 1 capital ratios and -0.18 for total assets and Total capital ratios are insignificant. Therefore, 
the regulatory capital levels of the banks in the sample are essentially independent of the size of 
the companies. Overall our analysis suggests that target banks have, on average, significantly 
higher capital ratios than their acquirers, and this differential is not accounted for by the smaller 
size of the acquired institutions.  
Second, we compare the mean capital ratios and total assets of target and acquiring banks 
with those of their non-merging counterparts. Looking at the total sample of all banks we find 
that acquirers are significantly larger than non-merging banks. Their slightly lower capital ratios 
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are, however, not found to be significantly different from non-merging bank’s ratios. Target 
banks are not significantly different in size than non-merged banks.20 With respect to the capital 
ratios, we find for the total sample and the US sub-sample that target banks have, on average, 
significantly higher pre-merger capital ratios than their non-acquired counterparts. The finding is 
robust and holds for both Tier 1 and Total capital ratios. For the European sub-sample, however, 
although positive in sign, the difference between the capital ratios of acquired and non-acquired 
institutions is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the results are generally consistent with 
our expectations that target banks have, on average, higher pre-merger regulatory capital levels 
than their non-acquired peers.  
Finally, it is interesting to compare the regulatory capital levels of the US acquirers and 
targets to those of their European counterparts. Such a comparison is important for two reasons: 
First, US banks have a strong incentive to maintain their regulatory capital levels in the well-
capitalized category (Tier 1capital ≥ 6% and Total capital ≥10%) in order to avoid constant 
regulatory scrutiny and restrictions on their operations. As mentioned earlier, a bank may be 
disallowed to engage in a merger if the capital level of the combined entity threatens to fall short 
of minimum regulatory requirements. Therefore, it is interesting to see whether the Prompt 
Corrective Action provisions of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation are effective in 
raising the capital levels of US financial institutions. Second, and more important to the analysis 
in this paper, if the Prompt Corrective Action provisions do affect the capital holdings of US 
banks, the potential for reducing the capital levels of acquired institutions may be, other things 
equal, lower for the US companies than for their European counterparts. Therefore, if this turns 
out to be the case, a more meaningful measure of this potential would be the excess regulatory 
                                                          
20 Similar results are reported by Hannan and Rhoades (1987) and Wheelock and Wilson (2004). 
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capital of a bank - the capital above and over the regulatory requirements - rather than its actual 
capital ratios. The results suggest that European banks are, on average, significantly larger in size 
than their US counterparts. The finding holds for acquirers, targets, and non-merging banks. 
However, as suggested previously in the paper, this result is most probably attributable to the 
composition of the sample regarding listed banks and is not likely to be of general significance. 
Furthermore, US banks have significantly higher capital ratios than their European counterparts. 
The finding holds for both Tier 1 and total capital ratios as well as for acquirers, targets, and non-
merging banks. It thus appears that the Prompt Corrective Action provisions of the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation are effective in raising the capital levels of US banks.  
 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
  
To summarize, the results of the mean-difference tests suggest that target banks are, on 
average, significantly better capitalized than their acquirers and non-acquired peers. However, the 
results for the European sub-sample suggest that European targets do not differ significantly 
either in size or in capital from their non-acquired peers. Finally, comparisons of the capital 
levels of US and European banks suggest that the PCA provisions of the FDIC are effective in 
raising the capital levels of US institutions. Therefore, more meaningful comparisons of the 
capital levels of US and European banks could be made with the excess capital holdings of the 
banks rather than with their actual capital ratios. In the next section we will therefore focus on the 
role of excess regulatory capital when investigating the market valuation of bank M&As.   
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Market valuation of bank mergers and acquisitions 
To study the impact of regulatory capital on the market valuation of bank M&As, we 
employ standard event study methodology. Note that the market model parameters were 
estimated over a period of 200 days ranging from -240 to -41 days relative to the announcement 
day. The return on the DataStream bank sector index for the respective country was used as the 
benchmark. The advantage of using DataStream’s own index is that it is constructed in the same 
way for each country, so that differences in index composition do not affect the estimated 
coefficients. Furthermore, a bank sector index, rather than a total market index, is used in order to 
derive better estimates for the abnormal returns. The use of a total market index has the 
disadvantage of under- or overestimating the abnormal returns in cases of industry-specific 
developments, such as changes in regulatory requirements or a major restructuring, affecting the 
sector more than the market as a whole. However, most studies on abnormal returns in bank 
mergers, using both a bank sector index and a total market index to estimate abnormal returns, 
report that the results are not statistically different from each other (e.g. Cybo-Ottone and Murgia 
2000). Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) are calculated over several event windows 
to better evaluate the market reaction before and after the merger announcement as well as in the 
periods surrounding it. Furthermore, CAARs are calculated for the US and European sub-samples 
in addition to the total sample to examine any potential differences in the pattern of stock market 
reaction to merger announcements between the two markets.  
The results of the event studies are reported in Table 5. Panel A of Table 5 presents the 
cumulative average abnormal returns for the total sample of target banks as well as for the US 
and European sub-samples. Panel B reports the corresponding results for the sample of acquiring 
banks.  Consistent with the majority of studies on abnormal returns in bank mergers, target bank 
shareholders earn significantly positive abnormal returns in any of the event windows analyzed. 
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This is true for both the US and European sub-samples, as well as for the total sample of target 
banks. Consistent with other studies we find that target bank shareholders earn, on average, 
positive and highly significant abnormal returns in the period around the merger announcement. 
As such bank M&As in both the US and European markets create significant wealth for target 
bank shareholders. 21 Looking at the total sample of bank mergers, acquiring bank shareholders 
earn, on average, negative abnormal returns in any of the event windows analyzed. Furthermore, 
the results are statistically significant in most of the time intervals examined. Similarly, the 
results for the US acquirers are negative in most of the event windows analyzed and significant in 
particular in immediately surrounding the announcement day. Again, our results for US acquirers 
are consistent with those reported in other studies on abnormal returns in bank mergers.22 We can 
therefore confirm that US bank M&As destroy value for acquiring bank shareholders. Turning to 
the European acquirers, the results are mixed. Acquiring banks’ shareholders earn significantly 
positive abnormal returns on the days immediately surrounding the announcement. At the same 
                                                          
21 Regarding European bank mergers, Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and Beitel and Schiereck (2001) find for the 
[-1; +1] interval significant CAARs of 12.93% and 12.39%, respectively, which are similar to our CAAR of 14.74%. 
For the larger event window of [-20; +20], the same studies find significant CAARs of 15.30% and 16%, 
respectively, which compare well with our result of 17.68%. For US targets Siems (1996) and DeLong (2003a) find 
significant average abnormal returns (AAR) on the day of the merger announcement of 12% and 15.40%, 
respectively, which are comparable to our result of 13.87%. The former also reports a CAAR of 12.81% in the [-1; 0] 
event window, which is not considerably different from the result of this study (15.27%). Finally, our results are 
consistent with those of DeLong (2003a), who finds that, upon the announcement, non-US targets earn, on average, 
less that their US counterparts. 
22 For comparison, Siems (1996) finds a significantly negative CAAR of –1.96% in the [-1; +1] time interval, which 
is similar to our result of -1.50%. Hawawini and Swary (1990) report a negative and significant CAAR of –1.70% in 
the first five days after the merger announcement. The corresponding result of this study is –1.18%. 
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time, however, acquiring banks’ shareholders earn, on average, significantly negative abnormal 
returns after the announcement. A possible explanation for this finding is that as the 
consummation of the deals proceedes, possible implementation unexpected difficulties become 
clear causing the market to revise its initial expectations. A natural candidate for these 
implementation difficulties is the European legal system, which offers more protection to 
employees. Rad and Van Beek (1999) point out that this makes it more difficult to lay off 
redundant employees and realize cost cuts and operational synergies immediately after the 
completion of a merger. Overall, our results are consistent with those of other studies with a 
European focus in that acquiring bank shareholders earn positive or non-negative abnormal 
returns in the period immediately surrounding the announcement of the deal.23 This is in sharp 
contrast with the US evidence, where acquiring bank shareholders are found to experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns around the merger announcement. Finally, when 
comparing target and acquirer returns our results are generally consistent with DeLong (2003a), 
who finds that, upon the announcement, non-US bank mergers differ from US bank mergers in 
that non-US acquirers earn more and non-US targets earn less than their US counterparts. We 
find that, on the day of the announcement, European targets earn an average abnormal return of 
12.08% compared with 13.87% for the US targets. This lower abnormal return could also be 
driven by the regulatory impediments in Europe discussed above. European acquirers, however, 
earn a positive and significant average abnormal return of 0.76% on the announcement day, 
whereas their US counterparts earn a significantly negative average abnormal return of –0.79%.   
 
                                                          
23 See Cybo-Ottone and Murgia (2000) and Beitel and Schiereck (2001) who provide similar, yet more clear-cut 
results.  
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[Insert Table 5 about here] 
   
Regulatory capital and value creation 
To investigate the relationship between regulatory bank capital and value creation we 
follow Hannan and Pilloff (2004), and focus on excess regulatory capital rather than actual 
capital. They define excess capital as the “difference between the actual capital ratios less some 
critical level based on regulatory requirements or standards”. This critical level is given as the 4% 
and 8% of Tier 1 and Total capital requirements for European banks and the 6% and 10% capital 
requirements for US banks. If US banks are, in effect, required to hold more capital than their 
European counterparts - the results of the mean-difference tests strongly point to this conclusion - 
the former may have a lower capacity, other things equal, to reduce their capital levels and those 
of the acquired institutions than the latter. Therefore, the measure of excess capital puts this 
capacity on a common scale and allows for more meaningful comparisons of the capital levels of 
US and European banks. Table 6 summarizes the results of our analysis into the differences in 
abnormal returns between banks with high versus low excess capital.24 In particular, we compare 
mergers where the target (acquirer) belongs to the top 25% fractile with respect to excess capital 
to those mergers where the target (acquirer) belongs to the bottom 25% fractile. Note that once 
we have classified a merger as belonging to the top or bottom fractile based on the target’s 
(acquirer’s) excess capital, we look at both the acquirer and the target’s value effects. Finally, we 
perform the analyses separately for Tier 1 and Total capital ratios.  
                                                          
24 In contrast to Table 5, Table 6 reports results for selected time periods only. We focus on the short-run 
surrounding the announcement up to a time interval of [-1,+1] and a longer-run after the announcement represented 
by the time intervals [0,+20] and [0,+40]. 
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The results for targets reported in Panel A and B suggest that mergers involving targets 
with high levels of excess regulatory capital create more value for target banks’ shareholders 
around the time of the merger announcement. The difference in short- and longer-term abnormal 
returns between the two portfolios is positive and highly significant for both Tier 1 and Total 
capital ratios. Clearly, high-capital targets are valued more by the market than their lower-
capitalized counterparts. Looking now at the acquirer results in the same panels reveals that there 
is no difference in abnormal returns for acquirers bidding for high versus low capital targets. 
Taken together the results in Panel A and B suggest that mergers with high excess capital targets 
create more value but that this value accrues fully to the target’s shareholders. This is consistent 
with the first part of the excess regulatory capital hypothesis outlined above. 
 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
The analysis of Panel C and D of Table 6 allows us to investigate this aspect by focusing 
on mergers with high versus low excess capital acquirers. Here the role of excess capital seems to 
be less relevant. There is some support that in the longer-run low-capitalized acquirers loose 
more than high-capitalized acquirers. Furthermore, targets that are acquired by high-capitalized 
acquirers seem to have a higher value effect than targets acquired by low-capitalized acquirers. 
This effect is especially strong when total excess capital of the acquirer is considered. It thus 
appears that the potential of the acquiring bank to reduce the capital holdings of the target 
institution – as suggested initially by the results of Panels A and B – does not play a role in the 
market valuation of target bank’s shares around the time of the merger announcement. Instead, a 
possible explanation for the results so far is that target banks’ abnormal returns may simply 
reflect the acquisition premiums that would be received by target banks’ shareholders in case the 
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merger is completed. However, mergers involving high capital partners are less likely to violate, 
post-acquisition, regulatory capital adequacy requirements and thus, other things equal, are more 
likely to be approved by regulators. Therefore, it is possible that target banks’ abnormal returns – 
and to a lesser extend also acquirer banks’ abnormal returns – adjust to reflect this probability.  
There is, however, another way to investigate the question of whether the potential of the 
acquirers to reduce the capital holdings of the targets plays a role in the market valuation of bank 
M&As. We therefore focus in Panel E and F relative capitalization of the target banks rather than 
on their absolute capital levels. Relative capitalization is defined as the capital holdings of the 
target banks divided by those of their acquirers. Bidding banks that acquire targets with high 
relative capitalization ratios have a higher potential to reduce the capital levels of the acquired 
institutions.25  The results in Panels E and F show no significant differences in abnormal returns 
for the target bank but the expected positive but only marginally significant difference i.e. in at 
announcement for the acquiring bank. This is consistent with our interpretation that the target 
banks’ abnormal return reflects an acquisition premium. It seems that the potential of the 
acquiring bank to reduce the excess capital holdings of the target institution is (marginally) 
valued by the market and this upside potential accrues to acquiring banks’ shareholders. This 
finding makes sense, as it is the acquiring bank’s shareholders (the potential new owners of the 
target) who will benefit from the reduction of the excess capital holdings of the acquired 
institution and reap the associated boost in returns.  
Finally, in order to analyze the joint impact of a number of explanatory variables we 
perform multiple OLS regressions of the abnormal returns of each bank on the following set of 
                                                          
25 Using the difference between the excess capital level of the target and that of its acquirer as an alternative measure 
of this potential, we obtain very similar results to those when using the relative capital ratio.  
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explanatory variables: The bank’s Tier 1 excess capital, the bank’s Tier 1 excess capital relative 
to that of its merger partner, the bank’s size given by the natural logarithm of its total assets, and 
the bank’s size relative to that of its merger partner also given in natural logarithm. To allow for 
possible differences between US and European mergers, we also include a dummy coded 1 if one 
of the merging banks is US-based. 
Looking first at the target banks confirms the results of the previous analyses. Target 
banks’ shareholders earn higher abnormal returns, the higher the target’s excess capital. This can 
reflect the probability of the merger being approved by regulators. The negative coefficient on the 
relative excess capital proxies, i.e. in the longer term, furthermore confirms the argument that 
targets that are acquired by better-capitalized acquirers seem to have a higher value effect than 
targets acquired by less well-capitalized acquirers. Consider a given target. On the one hand, if 
this target is acquired by a highly capitalized acquirer, its relative excess capital proxy is low and 
its abnormal return is high. On the other hand, if this target is acquired by a lowly capitalized 
acquirer, its relative excess capital proxy is high and its abnormal return is low. Thus, there exists 
an inverse relationship between the target’s abnormal return and its relative excess capital. 
Finally, the size of the target or its geographic location does not influence its abnormal return. 
The insignificance of the US dummy indicates that the differences in abnormal returns between 
the US and Europe reported in Table 5 can be fully explained by differences in excess regulatory 
capital. 
 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Turning now to the abnormal returns of acquiring banks’ shareholders reveals that these 
are negatively and significantly related to the size of the acquiring institution. A possible 
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explanation for this finding is the existence of economies of scale in banking.  Other things equal, 
smaller acquirers have a higher potential to realize economies of scale and, thus, they are likely to 
benefit more from an acquisition. For example, the acquiring institution may use the target bank’s 
distribution network and customer base to sell its own products and services. Furthermore, it may 
be able spread its managerial know-how on a larger scale. By contrast, a very large acquirer may 
even experience diseconomies of scale. Results to this effect are reported in Beitel and Schiereck 
(2001). The authors find that the 10 largest acquirers in their sample of European mergers show 
significantly negative abnormal returns around the announcement day, whereas the small and 
medium-sized acquirers experienced positive market reaction. In addition, our results suggest that 
the smaller the target bank relative to its acquirer, the higher the abnormal returns for acquiring 
banks’ shareholders. Again, a possible explanation for this finding is that by acquiring smaller 
banks, which are presumably less efficient and sophisticated, acquiring banks can benefit by 
improving the efficiency of the target. Secondly, the dummy variable indicating the market of the 
acquirer carries a negative and significant coefficient. This finding is, consistent with the event 
study results suggesting that European acquirers earn significantly higher abnormal returns on the 
day of the merger announcement than their US counterparts. In fact, as Panel B of Table 5, 
indicates, European acquirers earn, on average, positive and significant abnormal returns, 
whereas US acquirers experience significantly negative market reaction. Finally, the conclusions 
based Table 6 that the market positively values the potential of the acquirers to reduce the capital 
holdings of the targets and that better capitalized acquirers earn higher abnormal returns cannot 
be confirmed here. The coefficients of the excess as well as relative excess capital measures are 
insignificant.  
 
 
 29
CONCLUSIONS 
By examining 105 US and European bank mergers announced between 1997 and 2003 we 
can reveal several interesting effects of the target’s and acquirer’s regulatory capital. First, 
looking at the differences in regulatory capital shows that on average i.e. US targets maintained 
significantly higher levels of regulatory bank capital than their acquirers and non-acquired peers. 
Furthermore, US banks maintain, on average, significantly higher regulatory capital levels than 
their European counterparts. This finding indicates that the Prompt Corrective Action provisions 
of the FDIC are effective in raising the capital levels of US financial institutions. Second, the 
results of the analyses into the relationship between shareholder value creation and excess 
regulatory capital unambiguously point to one conclusion – capital is valuable in bank mergers. 
Mergers involving high-capital targets create more shareholders value, and targets that are 
acquired by better-capitalized acquirers seem to have a higher value effect than targets acquired 
by less well-capitalized acquirers.  
The results of this paper might appear to contradict those reported in other studies. 
Hannan and Rhoades (1987), O’Keefe (1996), Moore (1997), and Wheelock and Wilson (2000) 
have all found that banks with low equity capitalization rates (capital-to-assets ratios) are 
relatively more attractive as acquisition targets. However, there is not necessarily a contradiction. 
As stipulated by the Basle I Accord, regulatory capital ratios are designed to reflect the riskiness 
of financial institutions – it is the risk-weighted assets in the denominator of the ratio, rather than 
average total assets. Therefore, a more risk-averse institution having its portfolio invested in less 
risky assets, will have lower risk-adjusted assets and, consequently, higher regulatory capital 
ratios than an otherwise similar, but less risk-averse, bank. Furthermore, the more risk-averse a 
bank is, the higher its risk-based capital ratios will be relative to its equity-to-assets ratio. 
However, as less risky assets usually yield lower returns, such risk-averse institutions may have 
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problems providing adequate returns to shareholders. It is not surprising, therefore, that the same 
studies mentioned above also find that target banks have considerably lower ROAs and ROEs 
than their acquirers and non-acquired peers. Therefore, high regulatory capital targets may be 
penalized by the market for being excessively risk-averse and not taking advantage of the 
opportunity to invest in more profitable assets. The argument can be extended even further. In an 
effort to provide competitive returns to shareholders, such institutions may be tempted to reduce 
their equity capitalization rates rather than investing in more risky and profitable assets. 
However, as their regulatory capital ratios are much higher than their equity capitalization rates, 
and in all probability, much higher than regulatory requirements, those banks may be willing and 
able to maintain lower equity ratios than their competitors. This argument may help explain why 
target banks have, on average, higher regulatory capital ratios but at the same time lower equity 
capitalization rates than other, more efficient institutions. Is there any evidence to suggest that 
target banks are generally more risk-averse than their non-acquired counterparts? There is. For 
example, O’Keefe (1996) reports that target banks have significantly higher proportions of their 
assets in cash balances and significantly lower proportions in loans and securities than their 
peers. Similarly, Moore (1997) finds that the probability of acquisition is significantly and 
negatively related to the bank’s ratio of loans to total assets. Therefore, although seemingly in 
contrast, our results and those of other studies actually point to the same conclusion – target 
banks are excessively risk-averse and fail to provide adequate returns to shareholders. High 
capital ratios, low equity rates, and inadequate ROEs may be just different symptoms of the same 
problem – excessive risk-aversion. 
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Table 1: International definitions of bank capital provided by the Basle I Accord
Type of Capital Countries
Tier 1 (Core Capital)
A. Equity capital (including retained earnings) All
B. Discosed reserves All
C. Some forms of preferred stock United States
Less Goodwill
Tier 2 (Supplementary Capital)
A. General provisions/loan-loss reserves All
B. Undisclosed reserves Japan, Germany
C. Revaluation reserves All
D. Hybrid (debt-equity) instruments
1. Long-term preferred shares Canada
2. Titres participatifs, titres subordonnes France
3. Genusscheine Germany
4. Perpetual debts United Kingdom
5. Mandatory convertible debt instruments United States
Source:Bardos (1988: pp.26-34) 
Table 2: Capital thresholds and bank classification under Prompt Corrective Action (PCA).
Category Total risk-based Tier 1 risk-based Tier 1 leverage
Ratio Ratio Ratio
Well capitalized ≥10% ≥ 6% ≥ 5% 
Adequately capitalized ≥ 8% ≥ 4% ≥ ٭4%
Undercapitalised < 8% < 4% < ٭4%
Significantly undercapitalised < 6% < 3% < 3% 
Critically undercapitalised Tangible equity ratio ≤ ٭٭2%
.for institutions with a rating of one under the regulatory CAMELS rating system %3 ٭
.The tangible equity ratio is equal to tangible equity divided by total tangible assets ٭٭
 Source: Bondt and Prast (2000).
Table 3: Geographic and time distribution of bank merger sample
2003
B T B T B T B T B T B T B T B T
Belgium 1B 1B
Denmark 1B 2T 1B 1T 2B 3T
France 1B 1T 1B 1T
Germany 1B 1T 1B 1T 1B 1T 3B 3T
Greece 1B 1T 1B 1T 2B 2T
Italy 4B 4T 1B 1T 5B 5T
Norway 1B 1T 1B 1T
Sweden 2B 1T
UK 1B 1T 1T 1B 1T 1B 1T 2B 1T 1B 1T 4B 5T
USA 1B 38B 39T 8B 8T 20B 21T 17B 16T 84B 84T
Total  2B 2T 1B 1T 1B 1T 41B 41T 12B 12T 29B 29T 19B 19T 105B 105T
2001 2002 Total
B = bidder; T = target; domestic mergers = 100; cross-border mergers = 5. The cross-border deals account for the
differences in the number of bidders and targets for some of the countries.
1997 1998 1999 2000
Table 4: Differences in size and capital between banks
Panel A: Size and capital by type of bank
Obser-
bank type Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median vations
all banks
  acquirers 49,063.72 5,813.27 11.59 10.10 13.59 12.07 105
  targets 12,633.03 622.76 14.26 11.96 15.83 13.92 105
  non-merging 14,902.27 1,186.37 11.60 10.56 13.46 12.23 195
US banks
  acquirers 22,202.00 4,357.38 12.34 10.45 14.09 12.43 84
  targets 4,710.90 486.18 15.23 12.56 16.63 14.15 84
  non-merging 5,058.96 427.50 13.25 11.77 14.66 12.88 103
European banks
  acquirers 156,510.56 113,529.84 8.62 8.10 11.60 10.96 21
  targets 44,321.55 2,567.82 10.37 10.51 12.63 12.79 21
  non-merging 25,922.49 7,734.62 9.76 8.81 12.11 11.75 92
Panel B: Testing differences in mean
comparison test statistic p-value test statistic p-value test statistic p-value
bidder versus target banks
  all 3.041 0.001 -2.882 0.002 -2.544 0.006
  US 2.685 0.004 -2.659 0.004 -2.429 0.008
  European 2.371 0.009 -1.692 0.049 -0.986 0.165
target versus non-merging banks
  all -0.409 0.341 3.251 0.001 3.029 0.001
  US -0.097 0.461 1.955 0.026 1.975 0.025
  European 0.894 0.186 0.784 0.219 0.724 0.237
bidder versus non-merging banks
  all 2.969 0.001 -0.016 0.494 0.221 0.413
  US 2.569 0.005 -1.126 0.131 -0.728 0.234
  European 3.012 0.001 -1.321 0.098 -0.585 0.282
US versus European banks
  acquirers -3.094 0.001 3.688 0.000 2.443 0.009
  targets -1.988 0.023 4.371 0.000 3.726 0.000
  non-merging -3.299 0.000 5.597 0.000 4.281 0.000
In panel A, the dollar values of total assets are adjusted by the CPI to 2003 values. In panel B, note that for total assets, a non-
parametric z-test is applied. For capital ratios a t-test with unequal variances is applied. P-values refer to one-sided tests.
total assets ($ million) Tier 1 capital ratio (%) total capital ratio (%)
total assets Tier 1 capital ratio total capital ratio
Table 5: Event study results
event window CAAR (%) t-statistic CAAR (%) t-statistic CAAR (%) t-statistic
Panel A: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of targets
on the event day
AAR[0] 13.51 * 57.77 13.87 * 52.09 12.08 * 30.89
surrounding the event day
[-1,+1] 19.06 * 47.07 20.15 * 43.69 14.74 * 21.76
[-5,+5] 21.61 * 27.87 23.22 * 26.30 15.20 * 11.72
[-10,+10] 24.41 * 22.78 26.12 * 21.41 17.59 * 9.81
[-20,+20] 25.81 * 17.24 27.84 * 16.33 17.68 * 7.06
[-40,+40] 29.88 * 14.20 33.32 * 13.91 16.11 * 4.57
before the event day
[-1,0] 15.11 * 45.69 15.27 * 40.56 14.48 * 26.17
[-5,0] 16.98 * 29.64 17.24 * 26.44 15.93 * 16.63
[-10,0] 19.31 * 24.90 19.66 * 22.26 17.93 * 13.82
[-20,0] 20.40 * 19.04 21.00 * 17.21 18.01 * 10.05
[-40,0] 22.53 * 15.05 24.42 * 14.32 14.99 * 5.98
after the event day
[0,+1] 17.46 * 52.81 18.74 * 49.78 12.35 * 22.32
[0,+5] 18.15 * 31.68 19.85 * 30.44 11.35 * 11.85
[0,+10] 18.61 * 23.99 20.32 * 23.02 11.75 * 9.05
[0,+20] 18.92 * 17.65 20.71 * 16.98 11.76 * 6.56
[0,+40] 20.86 * 13.93 22.77 * 13.36 13.20 * 5.27
Panel B: Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAARs) of acquirers
on the event day
AAR[0] -0.48 * -2.22 -0.79 * -3.19 0.76 ** 2.10
surrounding the event day
[-1,+1] -0.99 * -2.63 -1.50 * -3.48 1.04 ** 1.67
[-5,+5] -1.70 * -2.37 -1.88 ** -2.29 -0.99 -0.83
[-10,+10] -2.40 * -2.41 -2.05 ** -1.80 -3.77 ** -2.29
[-20,+20] -2.29 -1.64 -1.29 -0.81 -6.26 * -2.72
[-40,+40] -1.10 -0.56 0.14 0.06 -6.06 ** -1.87
before the event day
[-1,0] -0.69 ** -2.25 -1.13 * -3.23 1.08 ** 2.12
[-5,0] -1.18 ** -2.22 -1.49 * -2.45 0.05 0.06
[-10,0] -1.64 ** -2.28 -1.88 ** -2.28 -0.69 -0.58
[-20,0] -1.40 -1.41 -1.49 -1.31 -1.04 -0.63
[-40,0] -0.79 -0.56 -0.84 -0.53 -0.58 -0.25
after the event day
[0,+1] -0.78 * -2.55 -1.16 * -3.30 0.72 1.42
[0,+5] -1.00 ** -1.89 -1.18 ** -1.95 -0.29 -0.33
[0,+10] -1.24 ** -1.72 -0.97 -1.17 -2.33 ** -1.95
[0,+20] -1.37 -1.38 -0.59 -0.52 -4.47 * -2.71
[0,+40] -0.80 -0.58 0.18 0.11 -4.72 ** -2.05
** Indicates results significant at the 5 % level.  * Indicates results significant at the 1% level.
all banks US banks European banks
Table 6: Value effects of regulatory excess capital
high capital quartile low capital quartile difference t-statistic
Panel A: Quartiles based on Tier 1 excess capital of targets
acquirers - AAR[0] -0.21% -0.45% 0.24% 0.1962
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] -1.09% 0.10% -1.19% -0.8025
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] -1.48% -1.54% 0.06% 0.0255
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] -0.69% -1.43% 0.74% 0.2696
targets - AAR[0] 17.58% 7.68% 9.90% ** 2.1589
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 21.10% 17.59% 3.51% 0.7453
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 24.81% 13.24% 11.57% * 2.5320
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 25.96% 15.81% 10.15% ** 2.0067
Panel B: Quartiles based on total excess capital of targets
acquirers - AAR[0] -0.60% -0.42% -0.19% -0.1589
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] -1.03% 0.02% -1.05% -0.7159
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] -0.69% -1.36% 0.67% 0.2581
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] 0.46% -0.95% 1.41% 0.4444
targets - AAR[0] 17.91% 10.62% 7.29% *** 1.4124
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 21.29% 19.75% 1.53% 0.2834
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 25.67% 16.81% 8.86% ** 1.7227
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 27.44% 19.75% 7.69% *** 1.3999
Panel C: Quartiles based on Tier 1 excess capital of acquirers
acquirers - AAR[0] -0.20% 0.21% -0.41% -0.4118
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] -0.38% 0.23% -0.60% -0.4600
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] 1.12% -2.17% 3.28% *** 1.2546
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] 1.97% -0.90% 2.87% 0.9034
targets - AAR[0] 16.21% 11.61% 4.60% 0.8133
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 22.24% 17.82% 4.43% 0.7331
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 24.32% 15.72% 8.60% *** 1.5919
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 26.61% 19.76% 6.86% 1.2200
Panel D: Quartiles based on total excess capital of acquirers
acquirers - AAR[0] -0.20% 0.23% -0.43% -0.4176
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] -0.41% -0.34% -0.07% -0.0493
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] 0.11% -3.19% 3.30% *** 1.3485
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] 0.12% -2.64% 2.76% 0.8966
targets - AAR[0] 16.39% 9.40% 6.99% *** 1.5045
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 23.16% 14.89% 8.27% ** 1.6956
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 24.07% 14.36% 9.70% ** 2.1391
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 25.92% 17.62% 8.30% ** 1.6682
Panel E: Quartiles based on Tier 1 relative excess capital
acquirers - AAR[0] 0.92% -1.35% 2.27% ** 2.0143
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] 0.54% -2.00% 2.54% *** 1.5495
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] -2.61% -0.08% -2.54% -1.2216
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] -3.26% -0.72% -2.54% -0.9644
targets - AAR[0] 10.61% 11.79% -1.18% -0.2772
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 15.86% 18.14% -2.28% -0.4836
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 16.67% 19.20% -2.53% -0.5335
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 18.95% 20.51% -1.56% -0.3204
average abnormal returns
Table 6 (conti.)
Panel F: Quartiles based on total relative excess capital
acquirers - AAR[0] 0.66% -0.53% 1.19% *** 1.2561
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] 0.05% -0.44% 0.49% 0.5145
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] -2.38% -0.07% -2.31% -1.1022
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] -3.90% 0.44% -4.34% *** -1.5190
targets - AAR[0] 11.11% 11.84% -0.73% -0.1755
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 16.26% 17.55% -1.29% -0.2901
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 17.31% 19.02% -1.71% -0.3689
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 19.19% 20.91% -1.73% -0.3469
Panel G: Quartiles based on bidder's asset size
acquirers - AAR[0] -0.81% -0.79% -0.02% -0.0197
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] -0.35% -0.12% -0.23% -0.1715
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] -4.04% -0.10% -3.94% ** -1.7230
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] -3.49% 0.63% -4.13% *** -1.5198
targets - AAR[0] 10.17% 11.69% -1.52% -0.2830
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 16.52% 17.77% -1.25% -0.2272
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 11.85% 20.28% -8.43% *** -1.4750
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 15.54% 21.40% -5.87% -0.9949
Panel H: Quartiles based on target's asset size
acquirers - AAR[0] -2.05% 0.12% -2.17% ** -1.6960
acquirers - CAAR[-1,+1] -2.23% -0.57% -1.66% -0.9094
acquirers - CAAR[0,+20] -4.42% -1.25% -3.18% -1.2051
acquirers - CAAR[0,+40] -2.62% -0.65% -1.98% -0.6146
targets - AAR[0] 9.61% 15.86% -6.26% *** -1.3211
targets - CAAR[-1,+1] 11.32% 22.95% -11.63% * -2.4754
targets - CAAR[0,+20] 11.99% 25.00% -13.01% * -2.4641
targets - CAAR[0,+40] 15.87% 26.42% -10.54% ** -1.8018
Note: The high and low capital quartiles are the top and bottom 25% fractiles. This leads to 26 observations for each fractile.
***, **, and * indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level respectively based on a one-sided t-test for differences in
mean assuming unequal variances. Tier 1 relative excess capital is defined as the Tier 1 excess capital of the target bank
divided by the Tier 1 excess capital of the bidder bank. The corresponding definition applies to total relative excess capital.
Table 7: Determinants of abnormal returns
Panel A: OLS regression results regarding abnormal returns of targets
dependent variable AR[0] AR[0] AR[-1,+1] AR[-1,+1] AR[0,+20] AR[0,+20] AR[0,+40] AR[0,+40]
constant 0.106 0.137 0.172 0.205 0.277 0.327 *** 0.224 0.274
0.543 0.734 0.878 1.091 1.409 1.740 1.057 1.350
Tier 1 excess capital of target 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.008 ** 0.008 ***
1.719 1.650 2.161 1.850
Total excess capital of target 0.006 *** 0.006 0.008 ** 0.007 ***
1.659 1.617 2.061 1.669
Tier 1 excess relative capital -0.005 -0.007 *** -0.008 ** -0.008 ***
-1.130 -1.764 -2.029 -1.760
Total relative excess capital -0.003 -0.006 -0.007 *** -0.006
-0.851 -1.472 -1.748 -1.352
LN(total assets of target) -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.009 -0.014 -0.016 -0.010 -0.012
-0.219 -0.338 -0.649 -0.799 -1.256 -1.496 -0.832 -1.040
LN(total assets of target/acquirer) -0.011 -0.009 -0.028 ** -0.025 ** -0.011 -0.008 -0.016 -0.013
-0.853 -0.728 -2.087 -1.949 -0.849 -0.625 -1.136 -0.918
US merger dummy -0.007 -0.004 0.031 0.035 0.041 0.045 0.054 0.058
-0.159 -0.078 0.669 0.744 0.860 0.959 1.057 1.131
adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.055 0.049 0.081 0.074 0.053 0.044
Panel B: OLS regression results regarding abnormal returns of acquirers
dependent variable AR[0] AR[0] AR[-1,+1] AR[-1,+1] AR[0,+20] AR[0,+20] AR[0,+40] AR[0,+40]
constant 0.062 0.065 0.033 0.038 0.093 0.107 0.131 0.134
1.443 1.571 0.568 0.496 1.025 1.243 1.112 1.197
Tier 1 excess capital of acquirer 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001
-0.229 0.575 0.227 -0.516
Total excess capital of acquirer 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001
-0.466 0.585 0.122 -0.616
Tier 1 excess relative capital 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.002
0.425 0.361 -1.478 -1.087
Total relative excess capital 0.000 0.000 -0.002 *** -0.002
0.372 0.107 -1.753 -1.190
LN(total assets of acquirer) -0.004 *** -0.004 *** -0.002 -0.002 -0.009 *** -0.010 ** -0.011 *** -0.011 ***
-1.719 -1.807 -0.638 -0.736 -1.769 -1.996 -1.679 -1.772
LN(total assets of target/acquirer) -0.008 * -0.008 * -0.004 -0.005 -0.009 -0.009 -0.010 -0.010
-2.894 -2.902 -1.220 -1.278 -1.552 -1.568 -1.371 -1.362
US merger dummy -0.021 ** -0.022 ** -0.030 ** -0.029 ** 0.025 0.025 0.034 0.033
-2.098 -2.130 -2.167 -2.119 1.166 0.238 1.214 1.188
adjusted R2 0.069 0.071 0.013 0.013 0.051 0.059 0.025 0.028
Note: All regressions are based on 105 observations. Tier 1 relative excess capital is defined as the Tier 1 excess capital of the target bank divided by the
Tier 1 excess capital of the acquirer bank. The corresponding definition applies to total relative excess capital. For each independent variable the top row
reports the estimated coefficient and the bottom row reports the t statistic against the null hypothesis of zero. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level respectively.
